What is SSL?

SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) is the original protocol for encrypting the connection between your browser and a website, so anyone watching the traffic in between sees only scrambled data instead of what you're actually sending or reading. Every version of SSL itself has since been retired for being insecure — what actually runs behind that familiar padlock icon today is its successor, TLS, though "SSL" has stuck around as the everyday name for both.

Animated padlock icon representing an SSL/TLS encrypted connection

SSL vs. TLS in 2026 — the version most people mean doesn't exist anymore

SSL 2.0 and 3.0 both shipped with cryptographic weaknesses serious enough that browsers eventually disabled them entirely. SSL 3.0's end came specifically because of the 2014 POODLE attack, which showed that a connection could be deliberately forced to fall back to SSL 3.0 and then broken with comparatively little effort. TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the protocol that replaced it, and every connection you make over HTTPS today uses TLS — version 1.2 or 1.3 in virtually all current traffic — never SSL itself.

How the handshake actually works

Your browser and the server can't just start encrypting with a single shared password neither of them had in advance, so the connection opens with a handshake that solves that problem in two stages. First, asymmetric cryptography (a public/private key pair) lets the two sides agree on a shared secret without ever transmitting that secret itself in a form anyone intercepting the traffic could use. Once that shared secret exists, the connection switches to symmetric encryption using it — much faster computationally, which is why TLS doesn't use asymmetric encryption for the entire session, only for the initial handshake.

The padlock doesn't mean what most people think it means

A valid certificate proves two specific things: the connection is encrypted, and whoever requested the certificate controlled the domain's DNS at the time it was issued. It says nothing about whether the site behind that domain is trustworthy. The cheapest, most common certificate type — Domain Validated (DV) — is exactly what a phishing site needs, and free automated issuance through services like Let's Encrypt means attackers can get a perfectly valid padlock in minutes for a domain built purely to impersonate a bank or retailer. For a deeper look at exactly what that padlock does and doesn't vouch for, see our guide on whether HTTPS means a website is safe.

The chain of trust, and what happens when it breaks

Every certificate is only trusted because a certificate authority (CA) vouches for it, and every browser maintains a list of CAs it trusts by default. That system depends entirely on CAs actually verifying what they claim to verify — and in 2011, the Dutch CA DigiNotar proved what happens when that assumption fails.

Attackers compromised DigiNotar's systems and issued 531 fraudulent certificates, including one for *.google.com, used to run man-in-the-middle attacks against an estimated 300,000 Gmail users inside Iran. The forgery was only caught because Chrome had separately "pinned" Google's real certificates in its own code — a hardcoded check that flagged DigiNotar's fake as wrong the moment a targeted user tried to log in through Chrome specifically. DigiNotar had run outdated, poorly segmented server software with no antivirus protection on its internal systems; once browser vendors stopped trusting its certificates entirely, the company went bankrupt within weeks.

The lesson wasn't really about DigiNotar specifically. It's that the chain of trust behind every padlock is only as strong as its weakest certificate authority — and a user has no way to see, from their own browser, which CA actually issued the certificate they're relying on without deliberately checking.

When the protocol's own code has a bug: Heartbleed

A valid certificate and a sound protocol design don't protect against a flaw in the actual software implementing them. In April 2014, researchers disclosed Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160), a bug in OpenSSL — the library behind a large share of the internet's HTTPS servers — that let an attacker request small chunks of a server's live memory, potentially including private keys, passwords, and session data. Netcraft estimated roughly 17% of the web's SSL-secured servers were vulnerable at disclosure — around half a million sites using certificates from trusted CAs. The bug had existed, unnoticed, for two years before it was found.

How to actually check a certificate yourself

Click the padlock icon in your browser's address bar and view the certificate details directly — check who issued it, what type it is, and its expiration date, rather than trusting the padlock's presence alone. Qualys SSL Labs' free SSL Server Test goes further, showing exactly which protocol version and cipher a site is actually negotiating and grading its overall configuration — detail the padlock icon alone never reveals.

Is SSL still used today, or has it been fully replaced by TLS?

It's been fully replaced. Every version of SSL — 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 — is deprecated and disabled by default in every modern browser, with SSL 3.0 specifically killed off after the 2014 POODLE attack showed it could be forced into a mode trivially easy to break. Every site you connect to over a padlocked connection today is running TLS, typically TLS 1.2 or 1.3. "SSL" survives purely as the term everyone still uses out of habit.

Does the padlock icon mean a site is safe or legitimate?

No — it only confirms the connection to that specific domain is encrypted, not that the site behind it is trustworthy. The cheapest and most common certificate type (Domain Validated) only proves someone controls the domain's DNS — it says nothing about who that someone is. Phishing sites routinely use valid HTTPS certificates today specifically because so many people still read the padlock as a safety signal.

What's the difference between DV, OV, and EV certificates?

They differ in how much the certificate authority actually verified before issuing. Domain Validated (DV) only confirms control over the domain — automatable in minutes, which is what services like Let's Encrypt issue for free. Organization Validated (OV) additionally confirms the requesting organization is a real, registered business. Extended Validation (EV) requires the most thorough manual vetting of the organization's legal identity. All three encrypt the connection identically — the difference is entirely about identity verification, not encryption strength.

Can someone intercept my traffic even if a site has a valid SSL/TLS certificate?

Yes, in two specific ways this page covers. If the certificate authority that issued the site's certificate is itself compromised (as DigiNotar was in 2011), an attacker can obtain a fraudulent-but-valid certificate for a domain they don't own. Separately, a bug in the software implementing TLS — as Heartbleed was in OpenSSL — can leak the private key or session data needed to decrypt traffic, regardless of how the certificate itself was issued.

Why did browsers remove the "green bar" EV indicator?

Because research showed almost no one noticed or understood it. Chrome and Firefox both phased out the distinct green address-bar treatment for EV certificates between 2018 and 2019 after usability studies found the extra visual indicator did little to help users spot phishing sites — most people don't distinguish DV, OV, and EV certificates by sight regardless of how the browser displays them. EV certificates still exist and still require the stricter vetting; they just don't look visually different in the address bar anymore.